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This paper is focused on relationships which involves the subsidiary both, at an internal 
(mainly with the headquarter) and at an external level (with economic actors at a local level, 
i.e. customers and suppliers). In so doing, corporate and external embeddedness (Andersson 
and Forsgren, 1996) are investigated under a network based approach.  
To reach this aim, the level of autonomy and control perceived by the subsidiary and the 
range of value chain activities managed at local level are used as proxy of the degree of 
corporate embeddedness. At the same time, the number, frequency, and type of relations 
activated with local supplier and customers and the number and types of cooperation 
agreements with local enterprises are used to investigate external embeddedness. 
The attention is focused on Italian SMEs internationalized in the Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs). With this respect, the sample is composed by firms that widely 
differ in terms of location, size, year of subsidiary establishment, and industry.  
The main evidence resulting from the analysis is that in the CEECs – and particularly in the  
more developed countries within the Region (such as Poland) – is emerging a phenomenon 
we define “re-localization”. By this term we describe a rising number of firms that is 
progressively transferring in these countries a wider range of activities, including the more 
value added ones. The delocalization of less value added activities (typically high-labour 
intensive and not complex manufacturing) was generally considered the main strategic aim 
for companies in the CEECs. Our data, on the contrary, seems to demonstrate that such a 
delocalization do not represent the ultimate result of the internationalization process, but only 
a step of a wider process. A process aimed at transferring abroad the whole value chain 
activities in order to serve the local market. Therefore, the internationalization of most of the 
analysed firms is market-oriented, i.e. aimed at looking for a new market, able to replace the 
Italian one.  
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Subsidiary Embeddedness of Italian Small- Medium-sized Firms in Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper aims at analysing the embeddedness of subsidiaries of Italian small and medium-
sized companies operating in central and eastern European Countries (CEECs). Such 
embeddedness is investigated with respect to corporate (that is, relationships with the 
headquarter) and external level (that is, relationships with other economic actors, such as 
suppliers, customers and competitors). In so doing we decided to specifically analyse 
variables influencing the two types of subsidiary embeddedness, while previous studies were 
more focused on the relationship between subsidiary embeddedness (especially the external 
one) and its performance or headquarter control on it (see, among others, Andersson and 
Forsgren 1996 ~ Andersson and Pahlberg 1997 ~ Andersson, Forsgren and Pedersen 2001 ~ 
Andersson, Forsgren and Holm 2002). 
The research objective was chosen because of several factors. With specific respect to the 
external embeddedness, several scholars demonstrated that external relationships represent the 
usual strategy Italian smaller organizations adopted in order to increase their size on the 
internal market (see for instance, Lorenzoni and Ornati 1988). Such a strategy seems to be 
quite spontaneos, especially at early stages of firm history. However, when time goes by 
though, the planning phase get more and more considerable and the evolution towards a 
network structure needs to be supported by strategic decisions. As a consequence, we were 
interested in verifying if such a strategy was replicated also at an international level. 
Secondly, it widely recognised (as briefly summarized in the next paragraph) the impact of 
subsidiary (corporate and local) embeddedness on its own performance. Thirdly, in the last 
years a huge amount of Italian companies decided to operate in CEECs: according to ICE   3
(2006) the number of Italian subsidiaries in CEECs increased of 26.1% in the period 2001-
2005, from 1.604 up to 2.023. While at the very beginning, the strategic aim was exclusively 
cost reduction based, actually - at least in the most developed of such countries (such as, 
Poland) - the strategy seems to be more market enlargment based. 
The paper is structured in four main sections. The first one contains a brief literature review 
on both, subsidiary embededeness and foreign direct investments on CEECs. In the second 
paragraph, adopted methodology is discussed and sample main feautures are presented. In the 
third section, hypotesis are developed and verified with respect to variables affecting 
corporate embededeness. In the fourth paragraph, hypotesis are developed and verified with 
respect to variables affecting external embeddedness. Some managerial and research 
implications complete the paper.  
 
1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Subsidiary embeddedness  
Management of multinational companies (MNCs) – especially of large ones - have attracted 
the interest of scholars for many decades. However less attention was paid, for a long time, to 
one actor of such organizations: the subsidiary. As correctly noted by Birkinshaw and Hood 
(1998), researches on MNC subsidiary management started only at the beginning of ‘80s (see 
for instance, Hedlund 1981 ~ Picard 1980 ~ Otterbeck 1981 ~ Garnier 1982). Since that time 
a lot of research was conducted on very different aspects related to MNC subsidiary 
management. Such contributions may be classified in three main streams of research 
(Birkinshaw and Hood 1998): 
a)  headquarter-subsidiary relationship: such a stream analyze aspects of dyadic 
relationships between subsidiary and headquarter. This type of studies assume a 
hierarchical point of view and consequently consider subsidiaries controlled by the   4
headquarter. Obtained results are generally considered not totally conclusive, 
especially with respect to elements as centralisation and control; 
b)  subsidiary role: such a stream of research raise up with the emergence – during the 
‘80s of alternative conceptions of MNC, mainly heterarchies, transnationals and 
networks. The adoption of such new points of view induced to conceptualize 
subsidiaries as organizational units having very different roles. As a consequence, 
influence of industry sector, local business environment and relationships with sisters 
subsidiaries became relevant for researchers. As a consequence, the subsidiary was 
conceptualized as a node within a complex network of relationships, both inside and 
outside the MNC (see, among others, Hedlund 1981 ~ Ghoshal and Bartlett ~ 1991 ~ 
Snow, Miles and Coleman Jr. 1992 ~ Nohria, Gulati and Ghoshal 1994); 
c)  subsidiary development: differently from the previous two streams of research, this 
one deals with a dynamic question and not a static one. More specifically, the research 
aims is to investigate how and why activities managed by the subsidiary change over 
time. Also this stream of research builds on a conceptualization of MNCs as networks 
but it takes into account also elements as resources and capabilities. 
Within the second research stream (subsidiary role) a specific focus was given to the concept 
of subsidiary embeddedness (see, among others, Andersson and Forsgren 1996 ~ Andersson 
and Pahlberg 1997 ~ Andersson, Forsgren and Pedersen 2001 ~ Andersson, Forsgren and 
Holm 2002). Such a concept was derived by Granovetter (1985) according to whom the 
behaviour of individuals can be explained by the characteristics of the networks within which 
a person is embedded. As a consequence, it is assumed that the behavoiur of subsidiaries are 
constrained by their embeddedness in ongoing relationships.  
As a consequence, it may be assumed that analyzing relationships operated by the subsidiary 
is possible to define its role within the MNC and the strategy adopted by the latter in the local   5
market. With this respect, it should be necessary to investigate all relationships the subsidiary 
manage with each type of actors, being them internal or external to the MNC. With this 
respect an useful framework may be presented by the the perspective of the N-form 
organizations presented by Nohria, Gulati and Ghoshal (1994). According such authors, in 
order to understand the managerial strategies of a MNC it would be worthy investigate the 
following types of relationships: 
-  among headquarters and the subsidiary (in the CEECs); 
-  among such a subsidiary and eventual others;  
-  with the network set by the subsidiary in the country of localization. 
With respect to the second level of analysis (relationships among sisters subsidiaries), it must 
be noted that our research is focused mainly on micro and small firms. As a consequence, a 
lot of them has only very few subsidiaries and often only the one we investigated. Therefore, 
we assume that is enough to pay attention to the relationships with the headquarter and those 
with the local network. With this respect in our paper we decide to focus on the so called 
corporate and external embeddedness (Andersson and Forsgren 1996). By the first term 
(corporate embeddedness) we mean exchange relationships with the headquarter that go 
beyond administrative links related to the belongings to the MNC. On the contrary, by 
external embeddedness we mean all relationships with organizational actors other than the 
MNC.  
Studies conducted on external and corporate embeddedness put in evidence some variables 
explaining such phenomenon. With respect to the latter (corporate embeddedness), for 
instance, Andersson and Forsgren (1996) conclude that the higher the degree of corporate 
embeddedness, the greater the amount of headquarter control.  
2. Foreign direct investments in CEECs  6
As earlier stated, in this paper we aim to investigate the subsidiary external and corporate 
embeddedness with respect to organizations placed in CEECs. With this respect, it is useful to 
take into account results raised up from prior research on variables affecting the localization 
of foreign direct investments (FDIs) in such geographical area. With this respect, it must be 
noted that such a type of studies were generally focused on location decision within United 
States, the European Union and China. Moreover, they generally use samples from US and 
Japanese firms. However a recent contribution from Majocchi and Strange (2006) clearly 
pointed out that the localization decision of Italian firms in CEECs may be mainly explained 
on the basis of five main elements:  
a)  market size,  
b)  market potential growth,  
c)  availability of labour (even if not necessarily skilled),  
d)  the openness of the economy to foreign trade, 
e)  decisions of previous investors. 
Such results broadly confirm the findings of similar studies related to other geographical 
areas. However, they demonstrate the relevance of some variables, namely trade and market 
liberalisation – which are generally considered less relevant. This evidence is consistent with 
Bevan, Estrin and Meyer (2004) findings. According to those authors, FDIs to transition 
economies are generally pushed by elements like: 
a)  development of private-owned business in place of state-owned companies, 
b)  development of banking sector, 
c)  liberalization of foreign exchange and trade, 
d)  development of legal institutions.   7
Since investigated CEECs appear to be very different with respect to variables considered in 
the two earlier summarized studies, we expect that at least external embeddedness may differ 
among subsidiaries placed in different countries.  
 
2. OBJECTIVES DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
On the basis of the theoretical framework previously described, we aim to analyse variables 
influencing corporate and external embeddedness of a sample of small and medium Italian 
enterprises which carried out investments in the CEECs. 
As earlier stated, findings by Andersson and Forsgren (1996) demonstrated that corporate 
embeddedness is strictly related to the level of control operated by the headquarter on the 
local subsidiary. As a consequence, it seems possible to assume that such a phenomenon 
(corporate embeddedness) may be investigated also considering the level of autonomy 
perceived from the latter. At the same time the level of autonomy is also related to the number 
of value chain activities operated by the subsidiary.  
With respect to external embeddedness, it must taken into account that a subsidiary’s 
environment consists of several types of direct exchange relationships. Moreover, there are 
also a huge number of indirect exchange relationships which are connected with the former. 
As a consequence the number of relationships to be investigated raise up dramatically. 
Accordingly with previous works (see, among others, Andersson and Forsgren 1996 ~ 
Andersson and Pahlberg 1997 ~ Andersson, Forsgren and Pedersen 2001 ~ Andersson, 
Forsgren and Holm 2002), we decided to focus our attention only on the following actors of 
the subsidiary’s local network: customers, suppliers and business partners.  
The analysed sample is composed by 72 enterprises – classified as micro, small or medium 
depending on the number of employees. These enterprises are part of a larger sample of 89 
enterprises which fully and exhaustively answered to the questionnaire sent to 969 different   8
firms1. We thus obtained an answer rate of about 10%, quite similar to the average of the best 
international surveys (Harzing 1997). Considering the large number of questions in the 
questionnaire and the objective complexity of some of them, the result achieved can be 
considered satisfactory.  
The most relevant features of the investigated sample are summarized in the Table 1.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3. CORPORATE EMBEDDEDNESS 
As mentioned above, one of the two aims of this paper is to verify, first the existence of 
corporate embeddedness and then to analyse the way subsidiaries of Italian small and 
medium-sized enterprises develop relationships at an internal level (with the headquarter and 
the others subsidiaries). In order to do this, we considered 3 variables, that is worth taking 
into account for such analysis. 
1. Autonomy degree perceived by the subsidiary itself 
As regards this proxy, data, if altogether considered, do not lead to specific conclusions (Fig. 
1). 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
However, it is necessary to remember that investigated enterprises deeply differ for several 
characteristics. As a consequence, we check if some of such features impact on the subsidiary 
perception of its autonomy from the headquarter. 
In other words, we are going to verify the following hypothesis: 
H1. The greater the headquarter size, the larger the number of subsidiaries defining their autonomy 
level as important or very important. 
H2. The older the subsidiary, the bigger its autonomy. 
H3. The more developed the country of localization, the bigger the subsidiary autonomy.   9
H4. Subsidiary autonomy is bigger as internationalization is aimed at looking for new markets, lower as 
internationalisation is low cost resources seeking. 
Doing so, we discovered that the greater the headquarter size, the larger the number of 
subsidiaries defining their autonomy level as important or very important is. Moreover, this is 
typical for Italian SMEs, where often happens, that most of the power is concentrated in the 
hands of one subject: the owner. The data in table 2 fully confirm hypothesis 1.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
At the same time, a positive correlation was discovered between the perceived autonomy 
degree and the subsidiary year of establishment. Such an evidence, besides being corroborated 
by Prahalad and Doz (1987), leads to concept of subsidiary life cycle (Birkinshaw and Hood 
1998) and establishment chain (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977).  
As regards the existence of relations between the subsidiary autonomy and its industrial 
sector
2, it is worth noting that we do not find any relationship among these two aspects of 
analysis. 
More interesting results raised up analysing the correlation among the autonomy degree and 
the country where the investment took place. With this respect, we noted that enterprises 
located in Poland, Slovenia, and Czech Republic face a greater autonomy (Tab. 3) compared 
with ones located in other countries. In order to better investigate such an aspect, we decided 
to focus our attention on two countries: Poland and Romania, for which we collected more 
empirical results. These two countries were chosen because of the huge number of 
investigated firms and of the different economic conditions. As regards the latter aspect, is 
difficult to quantify the development degree of a country. Economic development is 
continuously evolving. The tipical proxy used (IMF, World Economic Outlook 2006), to 
compare economy size across countries, is the per capita GDP based on PPP (purchasing-
power-parity) considered at current international dollar. At present, the per capita GDP of 
Poland is $ 13.797, and for Romania is $ 9.446, it means almost 5.000 dollars per capita more   10
for Polish. Moreover, considering the different rate of economic development of these two 
countries is also reflected in the different timing of entrance in the European Community. 
While Poland entered in 2004, Romania only on January 2007. 
Turning back to hypothesis 3, as regards autonomy we note that, while 78% of the Polish 
subsidiaries declare to enjoy a more than considerable strategic autonomy, the percentage 
drops to 42% when we consider the Romanian subsidiaries. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The gap might be explained considering that Italian enterprises which invested in Romania 
were mainly attracted by cost savings opportunities, while those ones which set up 
subsidiaries in Poland were also driven by market reasons (Tab. 4).  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Focusing our attention on the purposes companies declared to move their internationalization 
process in the CEECs, we concentrated on the research of low labour costs and on 
attractivness of the local market. With this respect it must be noted that only 20% of 
interviewed companies declared that their internationalization strategy was aimed to both 
objectives, showing a substantial dichotomy between such strategic goals. We noted that 56% 
of the subsidiaries pursuing a market oriented strategy declared an autonomy level of 4 or 5 
out of 5 levels, while among ones moved by efficiency reasons, only 27% showed a relevant 
autonomy. Finally, it is particularly significant that over 50% of the enterprises belonging to 
countries that joined the European Union only in January this year declared to aim to cost 
savings against 24% of enterprises of older member states. 
2. Control exerted on the foreign subsidiary by the Italian headquarter 
The second variable we used to analyse the headquarter-subsidiary relationships is the 
intensity of control exerted on the foreign subsidiary by the Italian headquarter and the tools 
under which this control is exerted. The importance of the variable “control” has been already   11
pointed out in the literature review, when referring to Andersson and Forsgren (1996). Under 
this point view, we note that this variable has been considered marginal by 29% of 
subsidiaries, while important or very important from 61% of the investigated companies (See 
Fig. 2).  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Moreover, taking into account what we found as regard the autonomy rate of the subsidiary, 
we are going to verify the following hypothesis: 
H5. The older the subsidiary, the lower the control exerted by its Italian headquarter. 
H6. The more developed the country of localization, the looser the control exerted on the subsidiary. 
Moreover, headquarter control is looser as internationalisation is aimed at looking for new markets and 
tighter as internationalisation is low-cost seeking? 
H7. The looser the control exerted on the subsidiary, the more widespread the use of profitability and 
sales targets. 
H8.  Control tools adoption, through production plans and output quality controls is higher in 
subsidiaries performing manufacturing activities. 
In so doing, we faced that the control rate is inversely proportional to the foreign subsidiary’s 
maturity, as in the case of the subsidiary autonomy and confirmed hypothesis 5. At the same 
time, we noted that the larger the headquarter, the tighter the control exerted on subsidiaries 
is. The latter result may be explained by the fact that medium-sized enterprises may easily 
allocate managers to control foreign subsidiaries, while micro and small companies has less 
resources to devote to such a task.  
With respect to the destination country, it came out that almost every single Romanian 
subsidiary (79%) declared to face a more than considerable control, against 52% of Polish 
ones (Table 5). This further confirms the already mentioned dichotomy between the 
internationalization aims carried out in these two countries by Italian enterprises, and verify 
hypothesis 6.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]   12
Based on such results, we carried out other analysis to verify the relationship between the 
control rate exerted by the headquarter and the strategic objectives pursued entering CEECs. 
As showed in Table 6, the control degree is much more curbed whereas local enterprise were 
started up for commercial purposes rather than cost reduction ones.  
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
To verify hypothesis 7, another investigation was done regarding the specific tools adopted to 
implement control on subsidiaries (Fig. 3). 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Subsidiaries that declared to undergo a scarce or barely significant control from the 
headquarter managers, seem strongly to rely on profitability and sales targets as control tools 
(37%) (Confirming hypothesis 7). Moreover data collected show how the control is looser in 
subsidiaries aimed at local market penetration. Quality controls, on the contrary, resulted 
more significant for micro and medium sized enterprises, where the small ones seemed to pay 
more attention to the profitability and sales goals. 
As easily expected, the monthly financial report, output quality controls, and periodic 
production plans turned to be the most diffused tools for manufacturing companies. Such 
evidence confirms hypothesis 8.  
Finally, older subsidiaries (the 40% of firms established before the nineties) are controlled 
thorough periodic production goals, while financial reports are used to track the performances 
of more recently established companies (Tab. 7). 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]  
3. Activities carried out by the subsidiary and contribution to the corporate value chain 
It is extremely interesting – with respect to our research aims – that the 55% of young 
subsidiaries (the ones established after 2001) has obtained from the headquarter the mandate 
to manage activities for the entire group. This results seems to be consistent with the idea of a   13
recent change in the internationalization strategies of Italian SMEs operating in the CEECs. 
More specifically, it seems they are moving toward a networked architecture where each 
subsidiary act as a “node” with a specific role within one field. As a consequence, it could 
also expected that a second degree internationalization process might occur in the next future 
(Holm 1994). 
Focusing our attention on the value chain activities performed by local subsidiaries, we are 
going to test the following hypothesis: 
  H9. The most diffused activities are the operative ones. 
  H10. The greater is the company, the wider is the range of activities performed. 
  H11. The older is the subsidiary, the wider is the range of activities performed. 
H12. There is a relation among the range and the type of value chain performed activities and the 
perceived level of autonomy. 
H13. The more developed the country of localization, the wider the range of activities performed by the 
subsidiary. 
As expected, the most diffused activities are the operative ones (43% of the analysed cases), 
followed by the sales (21%), while R&D and finance are extremely rare (Fig. 4). 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
A further analysis demonstrated that, as expected, subsidiaries belonging to micro firms 
usually perform only production - and eventually sales, while those depending by medium 
and small companies performs a wider range of value chain activities. As regards a time 
perspective, it seems possible to verify the presence of a “subsidiary life cycle” (Cotta 
Ramusino and Onetti 2006): more specifically, while the younger ones tend to be exclusively 
focused on production and procurement, the older ones often perform also marketing and 
treasury management. Almost all subsidiaries established between 1990 and 2000 declared to 
perform quite all value chain activities, entirely confirming the establishment chain theory 
(Johanson and Vahlne 1977) and our hypothesis 11.   14
Unexpectedly, it seems there is not a clear relation among the range – and the type of value 
chain performed activities and the perceived level of autonomy. Besides, firms that undergo a 
tight control by the managers’ headquarter often perform also “high end” activities such as 
marketing. Therefore hypothesis 12 is not confirmed. 
Another relevant results derived by a country based analysis. More specifically, while only 
two Romanian subsidiaries (12%) declare to perform activities different than production, 
more than 30% of Polish ones performs other value chain activities (Tab. 8). Such evidences 
verify the hypothesis under which the more developed the country of localization, the wider 
the range of activities performed by the subsidiary. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4. EXTERNAL EMBEDDEDNESS 
In order to analyse the external embeddedness, we focused the attention on transactions 
carried out by the subsidiary with local players, mainly suppliers and customers. Such 
transactions were investigated with respect to the number of involved players, time frequency, 
and exchange contents, that we sum up in a single variable called “quality of relationship with 
local enterprises”. In so doing, a significant openness to trade relationship with local 
enterprises was discovered, regarding both sales and supply (Fig. 5). 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
1. Quality of the relationship with local enterprises 
Once stated that these relationships exist, we try to investigate: 
  H14. The older the subsidiary, the wider and deeper the exchange with local actors. 
H15. The bigger the parent company, the higher the level of exchange with local actors. 
H16. The greater the subsidiary perceived autonomy, the wider the exchange with local actors 
H17. The less the subsidiary autonomy, the more involved the parent company in the definition of 
products features.   15
Deeply analysing this variable, we noted that the older the subsidiary the wider is the 
exchange with local players (from 71% of eldest companies to 55% of most recent, these data 
fully confirm hypothesis 14). The result under discussion seems to be consistent with the idea 
of a learning process by the local subsidiary. This step by step approach is mainly explained 
by the quite relevant “psychic distance” existing between Italy and the most of CEECs 
(Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul 1975). This would be confirmed also by the positive 
correlation between the parent company dimension and the subsidiary trade intensity with 
local actors. With this respect is worthy that other variables - such as the subsidiary perceived 
autonomy and the degree of personal control by the headquarter – resulted to be not relevant 
for the phenomenon explanation. 
Verified the presence of relationships at a local level, the attention was focused on the number 
of involved actors. In so doing, we discovered that the majority of investigated subsidiaries 
keep up to 10 supply relationships, demonstrating that the external network is generally at an 
embryonic level. At the same time, it must be pointed out that most of enterprises which have 
up to 10 purchase relationships were set in the second half of the 90s; while subsidiaries that 
keep relationships with over 50 local suppliers were generally set up between 1990 and 1995. 
Such results would confirm the idea of a learning process at the subsidiary level, while the 
degree of control and the perceived autonomy are less relevant in explaining this phenomenon 
(Fig. 6). 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Another element taken into account was related to the qualitative aspect of the relationship 
between the subsidiary and the local supplier. In so doing, a quite relevant level of satisfaction 
was verified, as demonstrated by the fact that 35% of investigated companies declare to have 
long term relationships (more than five years) with their suppliers.    16
Moreover, exchanges regard not only goods, but also technology and information: this 
happens exclusively in the case of small and micro companies. With respect to acquired 
products, in nearly half of cases (40-45%) they are defined on the basis of the Italian parent’s 
guidelines, regardless headquarters dimension and subsidiary’s establishment year. 
Furthermore, the less the subsidiary’s autonomy from its headquarter is, the more involved is 
the parent company in the definition of products features.  
Furthermore, data regarding relations carried out by subsidiaries and local customers (Fig. 7), 
show once again that the number of these relations is still very low, with rougly 30% of 
investigated enterprises keeping regular sales relations with local clients (and - anyway - less 
than 10) (Fig. 7).  
[INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
A more deepened analysis shows that most of enterprises which declared to have less than 10 
regular customers belong to micro enterprises established since 1995, while subsidiaries 
which avow to keep relations with more than 50 regular clients are mainly small enterprises.  
Analysing relations among subsidiary and local enterprise-customer on a qualitative base, it 
came out that in most cases the local customer define the characteristics of the product 
realized by the subsidiary, expecially in the case of micro and medium enterprises.  
The quality (richness/poorness) of relations with local customers were also analysed on the 
base of trade contents, frequence and satisfaction. Starting from the first aspect, we noticed 
that know-how transfer processes occur quite seldom, except for enterprises operating abroad 
since a long time. With respect to the satisfaction, subsidiaries experienced a very good 
situation, especially for those whose headquarters are small or medium companies. At the 
same time, rougly 32% of the sample consider their relations with local enterprises-customers 
as consolidated (more than 5 years long), regardless headquarters dimension, perceived   17
autonomy degree and headquarters control level. Finally, analyses based on geographical and 
industry did not lead to any rilevant result (Fig. 8). 
[INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The present paper aims to analyse the internationalization processes of micro, small, and 
medium sized Italian firms in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). In 
particular, the analysis focuses on the existence – or not – of network form of organization, 
both at corporate level (within the company, among subsidiaries and headquarter) and 
external level (among the subsidiaries and local firms). 
The main evidence resulting from the analysis is that in the CEECs – and particularly in more 
developed countries within the region (Poland) – is emerging a phenomenon we define “re-
localization”. By this term we describe a rising number of firms that is progressively 
transferring in these countries their high value added activities. This result seems to contradict 
the dominant interpretation given to the internationalization process in the East Europe: the 
literature and the praxis indicated in the delocalization of low end activities the main strategic 
driver for companies investing in that area. Our data, on the contrary, seems to demonstrate 
that such a delocalization do not represent the ultimate target of the internationalization 
process, but only a step of a wider process. A process aimed at transferring abroad the whole 
value chain activities in order to develop the local market. Therefore, the internationalization 
of most of the analysed firms is market-oriented, i.e. aimed at looking for new markets, able 
to replace the traditional ones (like the Italian market), where they are no longer competitive.  
Under this point of view, is worth noting that the 36% of interviewed Polish subsidiaries 
declared that the reason that aimed the internationalization process of the Italian headquarter 
was at looking for a new market, while the percentage of Romanian subsidiary that declared   18
internationalization aimed at low-cost resource seeking is 68%. Moreover, the 78% of Polish 
subsidiaries declared to enjoy a more than considerable strategic autonomy, while the 
percentage dropped to 42% when considering the Romanian ones. As it was easy to expect, 
the 77% of the total revenue of Romanian subsidiaries, in comparison to the 12% of the 
Polish ones, is repatriated. Another relevant result, derived by a country based analysis: while 
only the 12% of Romanian subsidiaries declared to perform activities different than 
production, more than 30% of Polish ones declared to perform other value chain activities. 
These data, in our opinion, confirmed the hypothesis of the existence of a “subsidiary’s value 
chain” (Cotta Ramusino and Onetti 2006), that foresees the progressive widening of the range 
of activities performed by the foreign subsidiaries and their level of autonomy. Data discussed 
in this paper provide shows that: 
1.  while subsdiaries recently established tend to focus almost exclusively on production 
and procurement, the older ones perform a wider range of activities, with a growing 
strategic impact (see, for example, the verified hypothesis 11); 
2.  subsidiaries, that define as key strategic factor the actractiveness of local market, 
present higher level of autonomy, while the ones, that aims at dropping production 
costs, show a more restricted level of autonomy (see, as example, the previosly 





1 The 969 enterprises, we sent the questionnaire to, have been selected by a initial database of around 1.600 Italian enterprises 
which invested in Middle-East Europe. This database was then “polished” to keep the no longer active companies out of the 
analysis. 
2 As regards to the manufacturing segmentation, we refer to the economic activities classification known as NACE: A- 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry; B- Fishing; C- Quarrying; D- Manufacturing; E- Electricity, gas and water supply; F- 
Construction; G- Ws. And retail trade; H- hotels, restaurants; I- Transport, post and telecommunications; J- Finance and 
business activities; K- Informatics, renting, research; L- Civil service; M- Education; N- Healthcare, welfare; O- Other public 
utilities; P- Household service; O- Organizations.   19
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 





% Industry  % 
Poland 37,50%  Micro  24,07% Manufacturing  70,97% 
Romania 19,44%  Small  24,07% Others  29,03% 
Hungary 15,28%  Medium  51,86% Entrance Strategy    
Slovenia 9,72%  Year of sub. 
establishment %  Greenfield 72,22% 
Czech Rep.  9,72%  up to 1990  5,56%  Merger&acquisition  27,88% 
Slovakia Rep.  6,94%  1990-1994  26,39%
Bulgaria 1,39%  1995-2000  52,78%




Table 2: Subsidiary’s autonomy level relatively to the headquarter’s size 
 Headquarter's  size
Autonomy level Micro firms Small firms Medium firms No answer Total amount
Scarce 33,3% 33,3% 20,0% 11,8% 19,4%
Barely significant 22,2% 33,3% 25,0% 8,8% 18,1%
Important 22,2% 35,0% 26,5% 25,0%
Very important 11,1% 11,8% 6,9%
Highly important 11,1% 22,2% 15,0% 26,5% 20,8%
No answer 11,1% 5,0% 14,7% 9,7%
Total amount 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00%
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Table 3: Subsidiary’s autonomy rate with regard to the internationalization country 
 Country






SLOVENIA UNGHERIA Total amount
Scarce 100,0% 7,4% 14,3% 35,7% 20,0% 36,4% 19,4%
Barely significant 7,4% 28,6% 21,4% 40,0% 42,9% 9,1% 18,1%
Important 33,3% 28,6% 28,6% 20,0% 14,3% 9,1% 25,0%
Very important 11,1% 7,1% 20,0% 6,9%
Highly important 33,3% 14,3% 7,1% 28,6% 18,2% 20,8%
No answer 7,4% 14,3% 0,0% 14,3% 27,3% 9,7%
Total amount 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
 
Table 4: Reasons for entering foreign markets and subsidiary’s autonomy 
Reasons for entering the foreign market
Nr % Nr % Nr % Nr % Nr %
Reduction of labour costs 22 30,56% 6 27,27% 5 22,73% 14 24,56% 8 53,33%
Actractiveness of local market 25 34,72% 14 56% 5 20% 22 38,60% 3 20%
Firms
Very important 
autohomy ( 4 or 5)
Superimposable EU member countries
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Table 5: Control rate with regards to the internationalization country 
 Country








SLOVENIA UNGHERIA Total amount
Scarce 29,6% 14,3% 40,0% 27,3% 20,8%
Barely significant 11,1% 7,1% 28,6% 8,3%
Important 29,6% 28,6% 50,0% 40,0% 28,6% 18,2% 31,9%
Tight 14,8% 28,6% 28,6% 20,0% 14,3% 16,7%
Very tight 100,0% 7,4% 28,6% 14,3% 27,3% 12,5%
No aswer 7,4% 14,3% 14,3% 27,3% 9,7%
Total amount 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
 
 
Table 6: Reasons for entering foreign markets and headquarters’ control rate 
Reasons for entering the foreign market
Nr % Nr % Nr % Nr % Nr %
Reduction of labour costs 22 30,56% 4 18,18% 5 22,73% 3 5,26% 1 6, 67%
Actractiveness of local market 25 34,72% 13 52% 5 20% 12 21,05% 1 6, 67%
EU member 
countries
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Table 7: Kind of formal control exerted and industrial sector 
 
Kind of formal control exerted by the 
headquarter A D E F G H I J K
Total amount
Monthly financial report 20,9% 22,2% 100,0% 25,0% 22,2% 16,7% 20,8%
Quarterly financial reporting 5,7% 11,1% 5,2%
Yearly financial reporting 10,8% 50,0% 11,1% 25,0% 22,2% 33,3% 12,5%
Plans with production goals 17,7% 33,3% 25,0% 11,1% 16,7% 17,7%
Profitability and sales goals 13,9% 33,3% 22,2% 14,1%
Quality control 18,4% 11,1% 33,3% 16,7%
Raw material selection 9,5% 7,8%
None 50,0% 2,5% 100,0% 3,1%
Other 50,0% 0,6% 50,0% 25,0% 2,1%
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Table 7: Kind of formal control exerted and industrial sector 
 
Kind of formal control exerted by the 
headquarter A D E F G H I J K
Total amount
Monthly financial report 20,9% 22,2% 100,0% 25,0% 22,2% 16,7% 20,8%
Quarterly financial reporting 5,7% 11,1% 5,2%
Yearly financial reporting 10,8% 50,0% 11,1% 25,0% 22,2% 33,3% 12,5%
Plans with production goals 17,7% 33,3% 25,0% 11,1% 16,7% 17,7%
Profitability and sales goals 13,9% 33,3% 22,2% 14,1%
Quality control 18,4% 11,1% 33,3% 16,7%
Raw material selection 9,5% 7,8%
None 50,0% 2,5% 100,0% 3,1%
Other 50,0% 0,6% 50,0% 25,0% 2,1%





Table 8: Activities performed by subsidiaries in relationship with the entered country 
 Country






SLOVENIA UNGHERIA Total amount
Production 100,0% 18,6% 10,0% 61,1% 20,0% 50,0% 33,3% 30,4%
Procurement 9,3% 5,6% 20,0% 12,5% 16,7% 9,8%
Sales and distribution 18,6% 20,0% 5,6% 10,0% 12,5% 16,7% 14,7%
Marketing 18,6% 20,0% 5,6% 10,8%
Communication 11,6% 20,0% 5,6% 7,8%
Administration and accounting 11,6% 10,0% 5,6% 20,0% 12,5% 8,3% 10,8%
Treasury management 4,7% 20,0% 3,9%
Long-term financial management 2,3% 10,0% 8,3% 2,9%
R&D 4,7% 11,1% 12,5% 4,9%
Other 20,0% 16,7% 3,9%
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Figure 8: Cooperation with local enterprises 
Other










on the local market
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